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Abstract
We analyze the strategic protection decision of an innovator between a patent
and secrecy in a setting with horizontally differentiated products. By intro-
ducing the patenting decision into the well known circular city model, the
impact of the disclosure requirement linked to a patent application as well as
the problem of legally inventing around a patent can be taken into account.
Asymmetry in the circular market leads to a consumer migration effect. We
find that secrecy may be the innovator’s profit maximizing strategy when-
ever the mandatory disclosure of information enhances the market entry of
competitors.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper Horstmann et al. (1985) were the first to question the
common assumption to the literature that every innovation is patented. Op-
posing the formerly stylized fact that the number of innovations and patents
could be seen as equivalent measures of a firm’s R&D output, Horstmann
et al. (1985) find that the propensity to patent (the proportion of innova-
tions that are actually patented) actually lies somewhere between zero and
one. Empirical studies strongly support this result: Analyzing data from the
1993 European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for up to 2849 R&D-
performing firms Arundel (2001) finds that a higher percentage of firms in
all size classes rates secrecy as more valuable than patents. In their empirical
study on the patenting decision of U. S. manufacturing firms Cohen et al.
(2000) find an increased emphasis on secrecy as a reason not to patent as
compared to an earlier study by Levin et al. (1987). Cohen et al. (2000)
isolate the two key reasons for firms not to patent as (i) the amount of infor-
mation disclosed in a patent application and (ii) the ease of legally inventing
around a patent. In this paper we treat both aspects interdependently.
To do this we perpetuate the results obtained in Horstmann et al. (1985) by
introducing the possibility of patenting into an oligopolistic model of horizon-
tally differentiated products. We assume that a drastic product innovation is
released on a new market where rivals may enter with non-infringing products
as patent protection is not perfect. While Horstmann et al. (1985) incorpo-
rate the disclosure requirement by assuming that the revelation of enabling
information makes imitation more profitable (see Horstmann et al. (1985),
p. 849), in our setting we are able to gain a further insight into the effective-
ness of the disclosure requirement. Assuming that the information revealed
due to the disclosure requirement reduces competitor’s market entry costs,
inventing around is facilitated so that possibly more firms are able to enter
the market due to a patent. Thus the positive effect of patent protection
may be opposed by a negative effect of the required disclosure.
In the present paper we analyze the influence of varying intensities of the
disclosure requirement’s impact on the patenting decision of the innovator.
We find that the innovator will patent as this is more profitable than se-
crecy as long as a patent is sufficiently broad. This result holds even in
both limit cases, when either the disclosure effect is absent or when the pro-
prietary knowledge is fully disclosed. Whenever initial market entry costs
are very high and thus form a natural barrier to entry, patenting becomes
needless and thus the innovator chooses secrecy. Note that the parameters
which positively influence the propensity to patent influence social welfare
in a contrary way: On the one hand, while the protective effect increases
the advantageousness of a patent, it diminishes social welfare by mitigating
competition between firms. On the other hand, the impact of the disclosure
effect, which has a detrimental effect on patenting, enhances social welfare
by imposing knowledge diffusion.1 This leads us to the conclusion that pol-
icy attempts which yield at improving the patent system to enhance social
welfare should by undertaken with great care, as they could possibly lead to
an unintended decline of patent applications.
Since the thought-provoking impulse of Horstmann et al. (1985) many at-
tempts have been made to analyze the patenting decision. Some of these
approaches rely on the assumption that the disclosure requirement does not
come to effect until a patent expires. Only then the enabling knowledge incor-
porated in the patent application can be used by competitors so that anyone
skilled in the art is able to produce and market the formerly protected inno-
vation.2 Various approaches incorporate the disclosure requirement in a more
adequate way. Empirically the extent of the disclosure requirement depends
on factors such as policy decisions, the use of patent applications as a means
to obtain technological knowledge input, and the industry specific usability
of knowledge spillover.3 Thus it is straightforward to assume that the impact
of the disclosure requirement is exogenously given. Nevertheless, variations
of this parameter may lead to changes in the interplay of the counter effects
of patenting (protection versus disclosure) which in the end may result in an
alteration of the propensity to patent. Thus implementing the possibility of a
varying extent of the disclosure requirement may reveal interesting insights.4
Introducing patent protection into a setting with horizontally differentiated
products goes back to Klemperer (1990). The main focus of his paper is
1These effects of patenting on social welfare are well known and straightforward. Yet
an extensive welfare analysis of the innovator’s patenting behavior in this model setting is
available from the author on request.
2Waterson (1990), Gallini (1992), Takalo (1998), Denicolo`, Franzoni (2004a,b), and
Bessen (2005) analyze the patenting decision but do not allow for an immediate impact
of the disclosure requirement.
3Arundel et al. (1995) find that the importance of information disclosure as a reason
not to patent varies throughout different industry sectors. This points to the fact that
the impact of the disclosure requirement differs subject to the respective industry sector
in which an innovative firm operates.
4In the work of Scotchmer , Green (1990), Erkal (2005) and Zaby (2009) the extent of
the disclosure requirement remains fixed whereas in Harter (1994), Bhattacharya, Guriev
(2006) and Aoki , Spiegel (2009) the impact of the required disclosure may vary. However,
the later contributions do not explicitly focus on the consequences that a varying impact
of the disclosure requirement has on the counter effects of patenting and in the end on the
propensity to patent. Instead they consider the influence of alternative filing procedures
on the propensity to patent (Aoki , Spiegel (2009)) or the choice of alternative licensing
contracts (Bhattacharya, Guriev (2006)).
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to analyze a patent’s optimal design with regard to its length and breadth,
whereas the patenting decision per se is not considered. This is accomplished
by two subsequent papers: while Waterson (1990) focusses on a comparison
of fencepost versus signpost patent systems with regard to social welfare, in a
succeeding paper Harter (1994) examines the propensity to patent accounting
for a disclosure effect. The major drawback of his modeling approach is
that only one potential competitor profits from the merits of the mandatory
disclosure. This fact, which largely delimitates the impact of the disclosure
requirement, in the end leads Harter (1994) to conclude that there is no
causal relation between the required disclosure and the propensity to patent.
Economic intuition suggests the opposite: If the disclosure of information
leads to decreasing market entry costs, this may enable an increasing number
of firms to enter the market. A fact which the inventor will anticipate in his
decision to patent. The following analysis confirms this intuition.5
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the strategic
protection decision between a patent and secrecy into a setting with hori-
zontally differentiated products. The considered three stage game is solved
backward, beginning with the analysis of the price competition on the last
stage of the game in Section 2.1, proceeding with the market entry decisions
on the second stage of the game in Section 2.2 and finally the innovator’s
patenting decision on the first stage of the game in Section 2.3. Section 3
concludes. All Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Assume that one firm has successfully accomplished a drastic product innova-
tion and decides to release the new product immediately. As this innovative
firm owns the proprietary knowledge concerning the innovation, it will be mo-
nopolist in the new market as long as no other firm successfully invents. The
new product may be varied horizontally in its product characteristics which
are assumed to be continuously distributed on a circle of unit-circumference.
The innovator (and any other entering firm) can only offer one variant of
the good. We denote the total number of firms that operate in this differ-
entiated oligopoly as N = n + 1, consisting of the innovator and n entering
firms. Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the circle,
with density normalized to one. The preference of a consumer is denoted
by x ∈ [0, 1] and we assume without loss of generality that the innovator
5Two related papers analyze the impact of licensing in a differentiated duopoly (Wang ,
Yang (2003), Poddar , Sinha (2004)). Neither paper considers the patenting decision per
se, as both assume that the innovator has already patented his discovery.
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of the new product is located at the beginning of the circle, xρ = 0. If a
consumer cannot buy a good according to his preference he incurs a disutil-
ity that rises quadratically with the distance between his preferred good and
the offered good. We will refer to this disutility as mismatch costs. Each
consumer purchases one unit of the good as long as his net utility is weakly
positive, Ux = v− pz− (x−xz)2 ≥ 0 where xz represents the location of firm
z on the circle. We assume throughout the paper that the reservation price
v lies within the range 5/16 ≤ v < 3/4 which assures that only in the case
of monopoly, N = 1, some consumers prefer the outside option. For N > 1
all consumers buy one unit of the good choosing the variant which is closest
to their respective preference.
The structure of the model is as follows: on the first stage of a three-stage
game the innovator, already located in the new market, decides whether to
patent his innovation or to keep it secret, σ1ρ = {φ, s}. A patent protects a
given range of product space on the unit circle against the entry of rival firms.
The extent of protection is defined by the breadth of the patent, β ∈ ]0, 1[,
which is exogenous.6 We assume that the protected product space is situated
symmetrically around the location of the patentee’s product. Without loss
of generality we set xρ = 0 so that this point on the circle defines the middle
of the protected product space, see Figure 1. From there patent protection
covers β/2 of the neighboring product space on either side of the innovation.
location of the innovator
β/2β/2
Figure 1: Patent breadth
On the second stage potential rivals simultaneously decide whether to en-
ter the new market, given the patenting decision of the innovator, σ2n =
6Patent breadth can also be interpreted as a strategic decision variable of the innovator,
see Yiannaka, Fulton (2006).
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{entry, no entry}.
Upon entry all firms face market entry costs. These can be understood as
the costs necessary to achieve the capability to produce a variant of the
new product. If the innovator decides to patent his discovery, according to
patent law he is required to disclose sufficient information so that anyone
skilled in the art is able to reproduce the patented product. Although his
competitors are not allowed to copy the protected product, they have the
possibility to invent around the patent as long as patent breadth does not
deter entry completely, β < 1. Whenever a rival decides to enter the market
despite of a patent, he profits from the disclosed information: achieving the
capability to enter the new market is now easier and thus less costly. If we
denote market entry costs in the case of secrecy by fs, then in the case of a
patent they decrease to fφ with fφ ≡ λfs, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, where λ is a measure
for the impact of the disclosure requirement which may differ subject to
specific market conditions.7 Concerning the location of firms, we will use the
well established principle of maximum differentiation meaning that firms will
locate as far away from each other as possible to soften price competition.8
Thus, if secrecy prevails firms will locate equidistantly on the unit circle.
With a patent potential entrants cannot freely locate on the unit circle due
to the range of protected product space. Still, they will try to move as close
as possible to their profit maximizing, equidistant locations. Consequently,
in the case of a patent, when the choice of location is restricted to the product
space 1−β, the direct neighbors of the patentee will locate at the borders of
the patent and all other entrants will locate equidistantly between them.9
On the third stage all firms in the new market compete in prices, σ3ρ,N = p.
2.1 Price Competition
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game by back-
ward induction, setting off with the last stage. Here we have to distinguish
the cases:
(i) the innovator has not patented, σ1ρ = {s},
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ρ = {φ}
7See Footnote 3 for the empirical motivation of this assumption.
8Kats (1995) shows that this principle leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
a price then location game in a circular market.
9It is easy to check that with a patent even for Nφ = 3 the incentive to soften price
competition leads the entering firms to choose locations as far away from each other as
possible so that they locate at the patent’s borders.
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We will consider the cases subsequently, starting with case (i).
(i) the innovator has not patented σ1ρ = {s}
In the case that the innovator refrains from patenting and chooses secrecy to
protect his innovation, our model simplifies to the well known Salop (1979)
model of a circular city which we will briefly analyze in the following: All firms
are symmetric so that it suffices to analyze the decision of one representative
firm denoted by k. By assumption the outside option only plays a role in the
case of monopoly, a market structure that will result if market entry costs
are extremely high. We will turn to this case later. With moderate market
entry costs, every consumer in the non-protected market buys one unit of the
differentiated product from the firm that offers the variant which is closest
to his preferences. The consumer indifferent between buying from firm k or
a neighboring firm, lets say m, thus can be found by equating the respective
utilities he has by buying from either of them, U(k) = v − pk − (|xˆk|)2 =
v − pm − (|1/N − xˆk|)2 = U(m). Solving for xˆk we get
xˆk =
(pm − pk)
2
N s +
1
2N s
(1)
and can derive the demand for a representative firm operating in the market
as Dk = 2xˆ
k = (pm − pk)N s + 1/N s. Standard computations then yield
equilibrium prices,
p∗ = 1/(N s)2, (2)
and profits
pi∗n = 1/(N
s)3 − fs (3)
for the N s entering firms. Note that the profit of the innovator amounts to
pi∗ρ = 1/(N
s)3 (4)
as he does not face market entry costs.
In the case that only the innovator offers the innovative product due to
extremely high market entry costs, we assume that consumers may not buy
it if their preferences strongly differ from the characteristics of the offered
product. The outside option they prefer may for example be an antecessor
product of the innovation. Imagine the time immediately after the innovation
has been placed in the market. Some consumers have a strong preference for
it, others rather stick with less innovative products offered outside of the
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market. As soon as the innovation is copied by other firms and offered in
differentiated versions, mismatch costs go down and consumers may decide
to buy the innovative product rather than an outside option. Technically
speaking, consumers will prefer to buy from the innovator in the case N s = 1
as long as v − pρ − (xˆρ, out)2 ≥ 0. Solving for xˆρ, out we get
xˆρ, out ≤√v − pρ , (5)
where xˆρ, out is the consumer indifferent between buying from the patentee or
buying the outside option.
This defines the innovator’s demand for the case N s = 1 as Dρ = 2xˆ
ρ, out so
that he maximizes his profits pisρ = pρ 2xˆ
ρ, out by setting the price pρ = 2v/3.
His profits then amount to10
pisρ =
4v
3
√
v
3
. (6)
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ρ = {φ}
Now let us turn to case (ii) and look at the situation when the innovator
decides to protect the new product by a patent. As long as the breadth of
the patent is rather moderate, β/2 < 1/Nφ, the patent does not influence the
location of rival firms and the symmetric result derived above emerges. Note
though, that due to the assumption that the disclosure requirement lowers
market entry costs, fφ < fs, more firms than in the case without a patent
might enter the market. We will turn to this fact later. If the protectional
degree of the patent is high,
β
2
≥ 1
Nφ
, (7)
equidistant location on the entire circumference of the circle is no longer
possible as the patent restricts the locations for entering firms to the product
10As the outside option should restrict the demand of the innovator to Dsρ < 1 as long
as Ns = 1, the preference parameter v has to meet the condition 2
√
v/(3) < 1. Solving
for v we get v < 3/4 as the lower bound of the preference parameter.
For Ns = 2 the additional firm i will locate at the opposite of the innovator at xi = 1/2.
The indifferent consumer between i and ρ can be found by substituting Ns = 2 in equation
(1) as xˆρ, i = 1/4. Prices and profits can be derived by inserting Ns = 2 in equations (2)
and (3). We get pρ = pi = p
∗
∣∣
Ns=2
= 1/4 and pisρ = 1/8, pi
s
i = 1/8 − fs. As the
outside option should be of no interest for the indifferent consumer xˆρ, i, the condition
v−p∗∣∣
Ns=2
−(xˆρ, i)2 ≥ 0 has to be met. Inserting p∗∣∣
Ns=2
= 1/4 and xˆρ, i as derived above,
the critical condition simplifies to v ≥ 5/16 so that the domain of the preference parameter
that narrows the outside option’s relevance to the case Ns = 1 is 5/16 ≤ v < 3/4.
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space 1 − β. We will define patents in a setting where patent breadth, β,
fulfills condition (7) as restrictive patents. The following figure depicts firm’s
locations with Nφ = 4 for the cases (a) that the patent is not restrictive
(β < 1/2), and (b) that the patent is restrictive (β ≥ 1/2).
ρ
i j
i+ 1
(a) non-restrictive patent
ρ
i j
i+ 1
(b) restrictive patent
Figure 2: Firm’s locations with a patent, Nφ = 4
In the case that the innovator patents, firm’s neighborhoods are no longer
uniform, but are dependent on the respective location of a firm. To dis-
tinguish firm’s locations we will refer to the left and right neighbor of the
innovator as firms i and j. Further we will denote the first right (left) neigh-
bor of i (j) by i+1 (j+1), the second by i+2 (j+2) and so on. Consequently,
with a restrictive patent an equilibrium can no longer be derived by analyz-
ing a representative firm, as the respective neighborhood of a firm now plays
a crucial role for its pricing decision. We have to distinguish three types of
firms, differing by their respective neighborhood:
a) the patentee has a uniform neighborhood consisting of firms i and j
b) the
”
border“ firms i and j have an non-uniform neighborhood with
the patentee on the one side and either each other or, if n > 2, a
non-patentee, non-border firm i+ 1 or j + 1 on the other side
c) a non-patentee, non-border firm i+ κ, κ ≥ 1 always has a non-uniform
neighborhood (i+ κ− 1 to the left, i+ κ+ 1 to the right side) as long
as it is not the firm with the greatest distance to the patentee. For this
firm we need to distinguish two cases that depend on the number of
non-patentee firms n
9
• if n is even, which we will denote by ne, then the firm furthest
away from the patentee is firm i+(ne/2−1) and its neighborhood
is non-uniform: to the left firm i + (ne/2 − 2), to the right firm
j + (ne/2− 1)
• if n is uneven, nu, then the firm furthest away is firm i+(nu−1)/2
and its neighborhood is uniform: to the left firm i + (nu − 3)/2,
to the right firm j + (nu − 3)/2.
As all non-patentee firms are ex-ante symmetric they will come to the same
decision whenever facing the same neighborhood. Thus, if an even number
of firms enters, every firm has a symmetric “partner“ that faces the same
neighborhood. In the following, we will refer to this as semi-circle symmetry.
If an uneven number of firms enters the market then the firm located furthest
away from the patentee has no symmetric ”partner”, we will refer to this case
as semi-circle asymmetry.
As we are analyzing the last stage of the game we take the number of firms
that have entered the market as given. Due to the fact that the neighborhood
of every firm is crucial for its individual demand and thus pricing decision, we
will have to distinguish the indifferent consumer between every pair of firms,
say y and z. From the viewpoint of firm y the indifferent consumer will be
denoted by xˆy,z, from the viewpoint of its neighbor z it will be denoted by
xˆz,y. By standard computations the location of the indifferent consumer can
be found by equating the respective utilities a consumer realizes by buying
from either of its neighboring firms.
We will set off deriving the demand for the different types of firms, starting
with the patentee. The indifferent consumer situated between the patentee,
ρ, and his left neighbor, i, is situated at xˆρ,i and can be found by equating
the respective utilities the consumer realizes by buying from either of the
firms
pφρ + (xˆρ,i)
2 = pφi +
(
β
2
− xˆρ,i
)2
xˆρ,i =
pφi − pφρ
β
+
β
4
. (8)
Necessarily the patentee’s left and right neighbor are semi-circle symmetric
so that the indifferent consumers on both sides of the patentee are located
at the same distance xˆρ,i = xˆρ,j. Thus the patentee’s demand is given by
Dφρ = 2xˆρ,i. (9)
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If a firm has a non-uniform neighborhood the indifferent consumers on ei-
ther side are not located equidistantly. This is the case for the patentee’s
neighbors, i and j. As they are semi-circle symmetric it suffices to derive the
demand for one firm, say i.
Due to its non-uniform neighborhood firm i’s demand consists of two different
parts: On the one hand all consumers between firm i and the indifferent
consumer to its left, xˆi, ρ, will buy from firm i. On the other hand, all
consumers between firm i and the indifferent consumer to its right, xˆi, i+1,
will buy its product.
Thus the demand of the firm amounts to
Dφi = xˆi, ρ + xˆi, i+1 with xˆi, i+1 =
(pφi+1 − pφi )(n− 1)
2(1− β) +
1− β
2(n− 1) . (10)
Note that whenever the difference between the firm’s prices is high, the con-
sumer indifferent between buying from firm i or firm i+1 is no longer situated
in-between firm i and firm i + 1 but is located to the left of firm i, as then
xˆi, i+1 < 0. This at first sight surprising result is quite intuitive: due to the
relatively low price firm i + 1 offers, even consumers situated in the proxi-
mate neighborhood of firm i prefer to buy the neighboring firm’s product as
the higher mismatch costs they face by doing so are overcompensated by the
lower price firm i+1 offers. We will refer to this shift in demand as consumer
migration effect.11
Last we need to calculate the demand for the non-patentee, non-border firms,
i+κ, κ ≥ 1. As mentioned earlier we have to distinguish whether the number
of non-patentee firms in the market is even or uneven. If it is even, ne, then
the neighborhood of firm i+κ, κ ∈ [1, ne/2−1] is non-uniform. The demand
of firm i+ κ given ne thus amounts to
D(ne)φ(i+κ) = xˆ(i+κ), (i+κ)−1 + xˆ(i+κ), (i+κ)+1. (11)
Now let us turn to the case where the number of non-patentee firms is uneven,
nu. Then the range of firms i+ κ changes to κ ∈ [1, (nu− 1)/2]. For ease of
exposition let us denote the firm with the furthest distance to the patentee
by i + κmax with κmax = (nu − 1)/2. As all firms i + κ < i + κmax have
non-uniform neighborhoods their demand is equal to D(ne)φ(i+κ). Due to the
assumption that firms locate equidistantly within the non-protected product
space, the location of firm i+κmax is exactly opposite to that of the patentee
so that xi+κmax = 1/2. Other than the neighboring firms, this firm faces a
uniform neighborhood and thus for an uneven number of firms the demand
11For a deeper analysis of this effect see Lemmata 1 and 2 in Section 2.2.
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for a non-patentee, non-border firm is given by
D(nu)φ(i+κ) =
{
D(ne)φ(i+κ) ∀ κ < n−12
2 xˆ(i+κmax), (i+κmax)−1 ∀ κ = n−12
(12)
Having derived the respective demand functions for the different firm loca-
tions, we can now turn to the price reaction functions of the firms. Again
we will look at the patentee first. His profits are piφρ = p
φ
ρD
φ
ρ . Inserting the
demand function from equation (9) and carrying out the optimization we get
pφρ(pi) =
pφi
2
+
β2
8
(13)
as the patentee’s price reaction function.
The semi-circle symmetric border-firms i and j face positive market entry
costs so their profits amount to piφi = p
φ
i D
φ
i − fφ. Their price reaction func-
tions can be derived as
pφi (pφ, pi+1) =
β(n− 1)
2Γ
pφi+1 +
(1− β)
Γ
pφρ +
β(1− β)
4(n− 1) (14)
with Γ ≡ 2 + β(n − 3). Analogously the price reaction functions of the
non-patentee, non-border firms i+ κ with κ ≥ 1 can be derived as
pφ(i+κ)(n
e) =
pφ(i+κ)+1 + p
φ
(i+κ)−1
4
+
1
2
(
1− β
n− 1
)2
(15)
for an even number of non-patentee firms and
pφ(i+κ)(n
u) =


pφ(i+κ)(n
e) ∀ κ < n−1
2
pφ(i+κ)+1
2 +
1
2
(
1− β
n− 1
)2
∀ κ = n−1
2
(16)
for an uneven number of non-patentee firms.12 This completes the analysis
of the last stage of the three stage game so that we can go one step backward
and look at the simultaneous market entry decisions of the non-patentee
firms.
12Note that for the case that the breadth of the patent tends to zero, β → 0, mean-
ing that all firms are able to locate equidistantly, the reaction functions pφ(i+κ)(n
u) and
pφ(i+κ)(n
e) simplify to pφ |β→0 = 1/N2 which corresponds to the price choice in the case
without a patent, see equation (2).
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2.2 Market Entry
The analysis of the market entry decisions again needs to distinguish the
cases (i) the innovator has not patented and (ii) the innovator has patented.
Recall that even if the innovator patents, his competitors have the possibility
to enter the market by inventing around the patent. As market entry costs
are lowered due to the information disclosure patenting requires, it might be
that more firms are able to enter with patent protection than with secrecy.
(i) the innovator has not patented σ1ρ = {s}
Whenever the innovator decides to keep his discovery secret the analysis of
the market entry decisions of his rivals corresponds to the well known Salop
result: the number of firms entering the market can be derived by solving
the zero-profit condition pisn = 0 of a representative firm for n. Using (3) we
get
(ns)0 = (1/fs)
1/3 − 1. (17)
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ρ = {φ}
If we turn to case (ii) and assume that the innovator has patented his inno-
vation on the first stage of the game, we can no longer pin down the market
entry decisions in one zero-profit condition. Due to the asymmetric neighbor-
hoods of firms the analysis of market entry becomes somewhat more complex.
In the following we will derive the critical thresholds of market entry costs
fφ that yield market structures varying from N
φ = 1 to Nφ → ∞. As the
patentee always operates in the market himself the total number of firms con-
sists of him and the number of entering firms. In the case that the innovator
has patented we denote the entering rival firms by nφ so that Nφ = nφ + 1.
To ease notation we simply use the respective number of firms operating in
the market as subscript, so the subscript 1 stands for the case Nφ = 1 and
so on.
If the patentee is the only firm in the market that offers the innovative prod-
uct, nφ = 0, the patent has no protective effect. Consequently, his profits
are the same as in the case of secrecy, piφρ, 1 = pi
s
ρ, 1 see equation (6). The case
nφ = 0 will occur whenever it is too costly for the patentee’s rivals to enter
the market with a variant of the innovative product. Thus the innovator’s
monopoly will prevail as long as market entry costs are higher than a critical
threshold at which a potential entrant would realize zero profits.
13
Note that this condition does not sufficiently define the exact number of
entering firms, as market entry costs could be low enough to allow more
than one rival firm to enter the market. For a sufficient definition of the
number of entering competitors a lower bound for market entry costs has
to be defined, where it is just not profitable for an additional firm to enter.
Necessarily the potential entrant(s) with the lowest profits is (are) decisive
for the critical threshold defining the number of entering firms. Following
economic intuition this must be the firm(s) located at the furthest distance
to the patentee which is due to the following fact: The border firms i and
j are able to set the highest prices of all non-patentee firms, as they face
a relatively large mass of consumers situated between themselves and the
patentee. This positive price effect of patent protection is passed on to every
other neighbor, but it gets weaker the further away from the patentee a firm
is located.
Whenever the number of entering firms, nφ, is even, all rivals have a semi-
symmetric partner and thus the profits of the two firms located at the greatest
distance to the patentee define the lower bound of market entry costs. When-
ever the number of entering firms is uneven, the firm located furthest away
from the patentee has no semi-symmetric partner and thus the lower bound
of market entry costs is given by its profits. Given the lower threshold for
market entry costs, the number of entering firms in general is sufficiently
defined by
fφ,Nφ ≥ fφ > fφ,Nφ+1 .
In the following we will describe in detail the derivation of the critical bound-
aries for Nφ = [2, 3, 4] as then the computation of all cases Nφ > 4 should
be obvious.
Suppose now that one additional firm, say i, enters the market, nφ = 1, so
that Nφ = 2 firms compete against each other. Recall from equation (7)
that β/2 ≥ 1/Nφ has to be fulfilled for a restrictive patent. For Nφ = 2
this condition changes to β ≥ 1. As we defined β ∈ ]0, 1[ this condition can
never be fulfilled meaning that a patent is never restrictive. Thus – following
the assumption of maximum differentiation – the entering firm locates at the
opposite of the patentee, xi = 1/2. As prices are equal in equilibrium, the
consumer indifferent between buying from firm i or from the patentee can be
found by substituting Nφ = 2 in equation (1) as xˆρ, i
∣∣
Nφ=2
= 1/4.
Prices and profits can then be derived as pρ, 2 = pi, 2 = 1/4 and pi
φ
ρ, 2 =
1/8, piφi, 2 = 1/8 − fφ. The critical threshold where an entering firm realizes
zero profits is thus given by fφ, 2 = 1/8 so that the necessary condition for a
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market structure with nφ = 1 is
fφ < fφ, 2 ≡ 1/8. (18)
Thus the market structure with one entering rival is defined by market entry
costs
fφ, 2 ≥ fφ > fφ, 3 .
For the case that two additional firms, i and j, enter the market, nφ = 2, the
condition for a restrictive patent changes to β ≥ 2/3. If 2/3 ≤ β < 1, the
patent restricts the product space where the two entering competitors can
choose to locate to 1− β. Whenever i and j enter, they have a non-uniform
neighborhood with the patentee to their left (right) and each other to their
right (left). Thus in the price reaction function of a non-patentee firm derived
in equation (14) we can set i+ 1 = j. Due to semi-circle symmetry we know
that pφi = p
φ
j . Using p
φ
ρ from equation (13) we can derive the equilibrium
prices
pφρ, 3 =
β(4− 2β − β2)
8(3− 2β) (19)
and
pφi, 3 =
β(1− β)(1− β/4)
3− 2β (20)
so that profits amount to
piφρ, 3 =
β(4− 2β − β2)2
32(3− 2β)2 (21)
piφi, 3 =
(4− β)2(2− β)(1− β)β
32(3− 2β)2 − fφ. (22)
Consequently, the critical threshold for market entry costs in the case Nφ = 3
is
fφ, 3 ≡ (4− β)
2(2− β)(1− β)β
32(3− 2β)2 (23)
and the case with two rivals entering the market is sufficiently defined by
fφ, 3 ≥ fφ > fφ, 4 .
To derive fφ, 4 we need to look at the case where three firms enter simultane-
ously, nφ = 3 and 1/2 ≤ β < 1. Recall that as the number of entering firms
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is uneven, one firm does not have a semi-symmetric partner, for nφ = 3 this
is firm i + 1. It’s price reaction function can be derived by inserting κ = 1
into equation (16). Note that the right neighbor of firm i+1 is firm j so that
we have pφ(i+κ)+1 = p
φ
j . The price reaction function then simplifies to
pφ(i+1), 4 =
pφj
2
+
(1− β)2
8
. (24)
As i and j are semi-circle symmetric, in equilibrium we must have pφi, 4 = p
φ
j, 4.
Simple computations then yield equilibrium prices and profits. Decisive for
the critical threshold of market entry costs is the profit of firm i+1 which is
located at the furthest distance to the patentee. We have
fφ, 4 ≡ (1− β)
32
. (25)
In the same manner the critical thresholds for market entry costs can be
derived for all market structures Nφ ≥ 4.13
Last let us turn to the limiting case fφ → 0, meaning that we have free
entry, nφ → ∞. The price reaction function of the patentee will not change
as it is independent of nφ, see equation (13). The case is different for the
non-patentee firms: in the limit case the border firm’s price reaction function
as derived in equation (14) degenerates (using De L’Hoˆspital) to pφi
∣∣
nφ→∞
=
pφi+1/2. In the limit, price competition between firms will become so tough
that they end up setting a price according to their cost, in our case pφi+κ = 0.
This means that all non-patentee firms will set the same price and have zero-
profits.14 We can derive the patentee’s optimal price choice in the limiting
case by inserting pφi = 0 in equation (13). This yields the price p
φ
ρ
∣∣
nφ→∞
=
β2/8 with the corresponding profits
piφρ
∣∣
nφ→∞
=
1
32
β3 . (26)
We will turn to the question whether a patent is profitable with extremely
low market entry costs in the next section.
Equipped with these results we are now able to take a closer look at the
consumer migration effect mentioned earlier.15 Due to the asymmetric equi-
librium prices demand may shift from a border firm, say i, to its neighbor
13The respective outcomes for the cases Nφ ∈ [1, 6] are summarized in Table 1 in the
Appendix.
14Klemperer (1990) comes to the same conclusion.
15Naturally the argumentation concerning the consumer migration effect holds for both
border firms, i and j and their respective neighbors i + 1 and j + 1. For the ease of
exposition we refer to firm i in the following.
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i+1 as the consumer indifferent between buying from either firm is no longer
located in-between the firms, but beyond the location of firm i, as depicted
in the following figure.16
ρ
i j
i+1 j+1
Dρ
Di
Di+1
Dj
Dj+1
xˆρ, j
xˆj, j+1
xˆj+1, i+1
xˆi+1, i
xˆi, ρ
Figure 3: The consumer migration effect for N = 5
We find that the factors leading to consumer migration correspond to the fac-
tors which strengthen price competition between the non-patentee firms. As
more firms enter in the non-protected product space the distance in-between
firms decreases and price competition becomes fiercer so that lower prices
result. Increasing breadth of a patent affects prices in the same way: as the
non-protected product space becomes narrower, firms move closer together
and again the intensified price competition leads to decreasing prices. The
following Lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 1 Consumer migration takes place whenever price asymmetry is
sufficiently high. The effect is higher the more firms are operating in the
market and the broader a patent is.
The consequence of the consumer migration effect is that even consumers
situated in the proximate neighborhood of a border firm prefer to buy the
neighboring non-border firm’s product so that the border firm’s demand nec-
essarily decreases. As the following Lemma states, consumer migration will
never reduce the border firm’s demand to zero.
Lemma 2 A border firm’s demand is positive for every restrictive patent.
16In the case N = 5 patent breadth needs to exceed βcme5 ≡ 19 (−5+
√
115) for consumer
migration to occur. See the Proof of Lemma 1.
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From the above Lemma we can deduce that consumer migration only in-
fluences the innovator’s patenting decision indirectly by driving the border
firm’s pricing decisions. Since their demand will always be positive, con-
sumers located in the proximate neighborhood of the innovator will never
have the incentive to migrate to firm i + 1. Technically speaking we have
xˆρ, i < β/2 − |xˆi, i+1| so that consumers migrate only from the border firms
to their non-patentee neighbors.
2.3 The Patenting Decision
On the first stage of the three-stage game the innovator decides whether to
patent his innovation or to keep it secret, σ1ρ = {φ, s}. His patenting deci-
sion is driven by two opposing effects. On the one hand a patent protects
part of the market, β, from the entrance of rival firms (protective effect),
on the other hand the disclosure requirement linked to a patent may lead to
decreasing market entry costs for potential rivals, possibly making market
entry profitable for a larger number of firms than with secrecy (disclosure
effect). Recall from above that we define the reduction of market entry costs
as fφ ≡ λfs. In the following we distinguish two cases: either the disclosure
requirement has an impact, 1 ≥ λ > λN , or it has no impact, λN ≥ λ ≥ 0.17
Whenever the disclosure requirement has no impact the reduction of market
entry costs is too small to change the number of entering firms so that patent-
ing will either lead to Nφ = N s, or will even reduce the number of firms in
the market, Nφ < N s. If the disclosure requirement has an impact it leads
to a sufficient decrease of market entry costs to make market entry profitable
for a larger number of rival firms, Nφ > N s. Intuitively it should be that
whenever patent protection is intense (β high), the protective effect domi-
nates the disclosure effect and the innovator will patent. If patent breadth
is rather low, the negative disclosure effect should dominate the protective
effect so the innovator will refrain from patenting.
To analyze the patenting decision of the innovator it is thus crucial to know
how many firms would enter the market with secrecy and distinguish how
many firms would possibly additionally enter with a patent. Recall from
above that the number of firms entering the market is sufficiently defined by
market entry costs with fN ≥ f > fN+1.
The following figure illustrates the critical thresholds of market entry costs
derived in Section 2.2 for alternative levels of patent breadth, β, where the
17The critical threshold λN is subject to the particular patent breadth β and the initial
market entry costs f¯N and can be derived as λ
N ≡ fN−1/f¯N where fN−1 is the next lower
critical threshold of market entry costs.
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solid lines depict the critical thresholds for the case that the innovator chooses
secrecy and the dashed lines depict the critical thresholds for the case that
the innovator patents.18
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Figure 4: Critical thresholds of market entry costs
Obviously fφ,Nφ and fs,Ns are equal up to the point where patent protection
becomes restrictive, β ≥ 2/N s. All combinations of f and β that lie between
two curves fN and fN+1 lead to a situation where N firms enter the market.
Thus in the upper shaded area Nφ = 3 firms would enter the market with a
patent while with secrecy any number N s ≥ 3 could enter in this area. In
the lower shaded area Nφ = 5 firms would enter with a patent while N s ≥ 5
could enter with secrecy. Figure 4 shows that given market entry costs and
patent breadth, a patent may lead to three different cases:
(a) due to a dominant protective effect less firms enter with a patent
(b) due to a dominant protective effect the number of firms stays un-
changed,
(c) due to a dominant disclosure effect more firms enter with a patent.
Take for example the combination f¯ , β¯ which leads to point A. With secrecy,
market entry costs f¯ allow N s = 4 firms to enter the market, with a patent
18Note that to maintain clarity we omitted fs,Ns for N
s < 3 and Ns > 6. The former
would be located above fs, 3 and all later below fs, 6.
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only Nφ = 3 firms could enter due to a strong protective effect (case (a)). If
patent breadth is rather low, β¯, the protective effect will only be moderate:
Given the same height of market entry costs, f¯ , we are at point B (B′) where
still N s = 4 but now Nφ = 4 firms would enter if the innovator patented (case
(b)). Now suppose that the disclosure requirement has an impact and leads to
a sufficient reduction of market entry costs to change the number of entering
firms. To differentiate between a high and a low impact of the disclosure
requirement we assume that for our example value β¯ the reduction of market
entry costs with a patent is rather moderate so we come to point C, for the
example value β¯ we assume a high impact of the disclosure requirement, so
that the reduction of market entry costs leads to point D. As fs = f¯ stays
unchanged, with secrecy N s = 4 firms would enter, but with a patent Nφ = 5
firms would be able to locate in the market for both values β¯ and β¯ (case
(c)).
To find out whether the innovator will choose to patent or to keep his innova-
tion secret in the cases considered above, we need to compare the respective
profits he can realize given the alternative combinations of market entry costs
and patent breadth. In the following figure the profits of the innovator sub-
ject to f and β (see table 1) are plotted for the cases that he chooses a patent
(dashed lines) or secrecy (solid lines).
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Figure 5: Alternative profits of the innovator with a patent/secrecy
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Let us start with the analysis of case (a) where N s > Nφ. For our exam-
ple combination f¯ , β¯ we need to compare the profits at points Aφ and As.
Obviously the innovator is better off with a patent in this case, as then he
realizes higher profits, piφρ, 3(β¯) > pi
s
ρ, 4(β¯). Things change in case (b) where
N s = Nφ = 4. In the above figure we can see that the respective profits with
a patent and secrecy, marked by the point Bs, Bφ are equal as the patent
is not restrictive, β¯ < 1/2. By assumption the innovator then prefers se-
crecy.19 If patent breadth increases to β′ the patent becomes restrictive since
β′ > 1/2 and the innovator will choose to patent, see points B′s and B′φ. At
last we turn to case (c) where the disclosure requirement has an impact so
that, speaking in terms of our example, patenting leads us to the points BC
or AD, respectively. For the relatively low value of patent breadth, β¯, the
innovator compares the profits marked by the points Bs and BC and will
apparently choose secrecy as pisρ, 4(β¯) > pi
φ
ρ, 5(β¯). Again, as patent breadth
increases, patenting may become the more attractive strategy: with our ex-
ample value β¯ the innovator faces As or AD, clearly preferring to patent since
piφρ, 3(β¯) > pi
s
ρ, 4(β¯).
In Figure 5 the profit function the innovator would realize in the case that
three rival firms entered with a patent shows some exceptional characteristics.
Compared to the profit functions for Nφ > 3 it is the only curve that has
an inner optimum for patent breadth so that for all β > βmax the patentee’s
profits are downward sloping. For very high values of β secrecy even becomes
the more attractive strategy.
This puzzling result contradicts economic intuition, as one would naturally
assume that a patent is the better for its holder, the broader it’s protective
level is. To discover the driving forces behind the patentee’s seemingly un-
common strategy choice in this case, let us take a closer look on how patent
breadth influences his profits if Nφ = 3. A change of β influences the paten-
tee’s profits in two ways: his demand as well as his optimal price choice are
altered. The following Lemma states in which way.
Lemma 3 For Nφ = 3 the patentee’s demand decreases as patent breadth
rises, while his price rises as long as β does not exceed a critical threshold
β0.
The intuition behind the above Lemma is the following: As patent breadth
increases, the border firms i and j are forced to move closer together. This
intensifies price competition between them, resulting in lower prices since
19If we would introduce patent costs into our model, the innovator would clearly refrain
from patenting in the case that it lead to the same profits as with secrecy.
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∂pφi, 3/∂β < 0. This in turn increases the demand of the border firms while
lowering that of the patentee. Nevertheless the patentee is initially able to
increase his price as the effect of the extending protected product space ex-
ceeds the negative effect of decreasing prices. Only for very high values of β
the patentee has to match his rivals in reducing prices as else he would lose
too many consumers. From this point on a further rise of patent breadth
leads to decreasing profits, eventually turning secrecy into the more attrac-
tive strategy.
The following Proposition summarizes our results so far.
Proposition 1 Whenever the disclosure requirement has no impact, λ ≤ λN ,
so that N s ≥ Nφ, the innovator’s protection decision depends solely on the
protective effect of a patent. If
(i) β ≤ 2/N s the protective effect is low and the innovator always prefers
secrecy
(ii) 2/N s < β < fφ,Nφ the protective effect is moderate and the innovator
always prefers to patent for Nφ > 3. For Nφ = 3 the innovator will
only patent if β < 0.915
(iii) β > fφ,Nφ the protective effect is high and the innovator always prefers
to patent.
The above Proposition covers the situation where the disclosure requirement
has no impact which leaves us to analyze the case where due to the required
disclosure of the innovation more firms are able to enter the market with a
patent, Nφ > N s (case (c)). From our example values β¯ and β¯ we know
that the impact of the disclosure requirement may lead to secrecy as well
as a patent, depending on the extent of patent breadth. In Figure 5 we
can see that the patent profit functions piφ
ρ,Nφ
for Nφ > 4 cross at least
one secrecy profit function piφρ,Ns with N
φ > N s. Let us call the intersection
point βˆNs, Nφ . As the patent profit functions are increasing in patent breadth,
the innovator will prefer secrecy for relatively low values of patent breadth,
β ≤ βˆNs, Nφ , and he will prefer to patent for relatively high values of patent
breadth, β > βˆNs, Nφ . Take for example the situation where with secrecy four
firms would enter the market and with a patent six firms could enter due to
the market entry costs reduction of the disclosure requirement. The relevant
intersection point in this case is βˆ4, 6. Whenever patent breadth is lower than
βˆ4, 6 the protective effect of the patent is too weak to outreach the negative
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effect of the disclosure requirement and the innovator will prefer secrecy as
this yields higher profits. If patent breadth exceeds the critical threshold,
the protective effect overcompensates the disclosure effect and the innovator
is better off with a patent. Generalizing these results we come to our next
Proposition.
Proposition 2 Whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, λ > λN ,
so that Nφ > N s, the innovator will
(i) prefer secrecy for all N s ≤ 3
(ii) prefer to patent for all N s > 3 if and only if patent breadth exceeds a
critical threshold β > βˆNs, Nφ. Else the innovator will prefer secrecy.
Note that – keeping the number of firms entering with secrecy, N s, fixed
– the critical threshold, βˆN¯s, Nφ , increases as the impact of the disclosure
requirement increases, i. e. more firms are able to enter with a patent. Thus
we come to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, the propen-
sity to patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure effect.
Last let us turn to the extreme case where the disclosure requirement has
a very high impact, λ → 1, so that market entry costs tend to zero and an
infinite number of firms enters. From equation (26) we know that in the limit
case for nφ →∞ the profit of the patentee amounts to piφρ
∣∣
nφ→∞
= β3/32. A
patent will be profitable for the innovator whenever it yields higher profits
than secrecy. The following Proposition states the result of this comparison.
Proposition 3 Whenever a patent requires complete disclosure, λ → 1, so
that nφ →∞, a patent is profitable for the innovator whenever patent breadth
exceeds a critical threshold, β > 2 3
√
4/N s. For N s ≤ 3 the innovator always
prefers secrecy.
Notably, even if the market will become extremely crowded with a patent
the innovator will nonetheless patent whenever patent breadth is sufficiently
high. Due to the strong protective effect with a high β the entering firms
have to locate in a rather narrow area of non-protected product space which
drives their prices and profits to zero. The distance β/2 between the patentee
and each of his neighbors then allows him to set a higher price which – in the
case that β is high enough – leads to higher profits than with secrecy where
the distance to a neighbor is only given by 1/N s.
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Summarizing we find that the innovator’s decision between a patent and se-
crecy in a differentiated oligopoly is mainly influenced by two factors: the
potentially substantial change in the number of entering firms due to the
disclosure requirement, and the breadth of the patent which is the determin-
ing factor for the strength of the protective effect. Whenever the disclosure
requirement has a high impact, meaning that more firms will enter due to
decreasing market entry costs, the innovator may prefer secrecy. If, however,
the disclosure requirement plays a minor role, a patent may be profit enhanc-
ing for the innovator, as it forces his rivals to locate their products further
away from him.
The following table summarizes our results for Nφ, N s ∈ [1, 6] and nφ →∞.
Nφ 1 2 3 4 5 6 nφ →∞
N s
1 secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy
2 –20 secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy
β < 0.91
patent
3 – patent
β ≥ 0.91
secrecy
secrecy secrecy secrecy secrecy
β ≤ 0.5
secrecy
β ≤ 0.65
secrecy
β ≤ 0.71
secrecy
β ≤ 0.79
secrecy
4 – patent patent
β > 0.5
patent
β > 0.65
patent
β > 0.71
patent
β > 0.79
patent
β ≤ 0.4
secrecy
β ≤ 0.48
secrecy
β ≤ 0.63
secrecy
5 – patent patent patent
β > 0.4
patent
β > 0.48
patent
β > 0.63
patent
β ≤ 0.33
secrecy
β ≤ 0.53
secrecy
6 – patent patent patent patent
β > 0.33
patent
β > 0.53
patent
Table 1: Summary of results
In the above table we find two regions where the protection decision is in-
dependent of patent breadth: in the lower left area where N s < Nφ the
20For Ns = 2 we must have fs, 2 ≥ f > fs, 3 whereas for Nφ = 1 market entry costs have
to fulfill fφ, 1 ≥ f > fφ, 2. We know that fφ, 1 = fs, 1 and fφ, 2 = fs, 2 so the later condition
changes to fs, 1 ≥ f > fs, 2 which cannot be fulfilled for any situation with Ns > 1.
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innovator chooses to patent and in the upper right area where N s ≤ 3 and
N s < Nφ the innovator chooses secrecy. In the area in-between, patent
breadth is the decisive factor for the dominant effect. If β is rather low, the
protective effect is weak so that the negative effect of the required disclosure
leads to secrecy. If patent breadth is rather high, the protective effect is
strong enough to overcompensate the disclosure effect so that the innovator
chooses to patent.
3 Concluding Remarks
Although there is strong empirical evidence that the disclosure requirement is
a major reason for firms to refrain from patenting, the influence of a varying
impact of the disclosure requirement on the propensity to patent has drawn
sparse attention in the theoretical literature so far.
Our aim was to provide a framework in which the decision of an innova-
tor between a patent and secrecy could be analyzed taking into account the
possibility of inventing around by competitors as well as a varying impact
of the disclosure requirement. To capture these effects we introduced the
strategic protection decision of an innovator in a model of horizontally differ-
entiated products. As here market entry costs are decisive for the number of
firms which are able to enter, the disclosure requirement’s impact could be
substantiated as a decrease of the initial market entry costs. Whenever the
innovator patents, asymmetry is introduced in the circular market, so that
it becomes crucial in which neighborhood a firm is situated. Due to the re-
sulting asymmetric equilibrium prices we found that consumer’s may choose
to buy from a non-neighboring firm whenever its price is sufficiently lower
than the prices offered in the direct neighborhood of the consumer. This
consumer migration effect is stronger, the more intense price competition be-
tween the non-patentee firms is. The patenting decision of the innovator is
indirectly influenced by this effect as he anticipates the pricing decisions of
his neighbor’s, the border firms, in setting his own price.
Our main results differ subject to the impact of the disclosure requirement:
Either the influence of the disclosure requirement is such that the number of
firms able to enter the market is left unchanged or it is such that the number
of firms increases. Whenever the disclosure requirement has no impact, the
patenting decision is solely driven by the protective effect – the broader a
patent is, the higher is the innovator’s propensity to patent. Other than
this, whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, we find that the
propensity to patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure effect.
A vast number of theoretical approaches concerning patents is dedicated to
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the optimal design of the different dimensions constituting a patent, namely
the interplay of patent scope, patent length and the inventive step.21 Natu-
rally most of this literature assumes that a patent already exists and does not
question an innovator’s decision on the method of appropriating his returns
on research investments. The focus of the present analysis was to challenge
the assumption that every innovation is patented by analyzing an innovator’s
decision to patent. Our finding that the propensity to patent actually lies be-
low unity asks for a more comprehensive approach to optimal patent design
where the patenting behavior of a successful inventor is properly taken into
account. Else, as the driving forces behind the propensity to patent influ-
ence social welfare contrarily, policy attempts could have the unintentional
outcome of decreasing the propensity to patent.
21An excellent survey is provided by Encaoua et al. (2006).
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Appendix
N piφ
ρ,Nφ
fs,Ns fφ,Nφ
1 4v
3
√
v
3
fs >
1
8
fφ >
1
8
2 1
8
1
8
1
8
3 β(4−2β−β
2)2
32(3−2β)2
1
27
β(4−β)2(2−β)(1−β)
32(3−2β)2
4 β
32
1
64
(1−β)
32
5 β(20+14β+11β
2)2
2·64(3+2β)2
1
125
(1−β)(8+4β−3β2)2
2·63(3+2β)2
6 β(2+3β+3β
2)2
8(7+9β)2
1
216
(1−β)(3+2β−3β2)2
16(7+9β)2
Table 2: Critical thresholds of market entry costs for N ∈ [1, 6]
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consumer migration takes place whenever xˆi, i+1 < 0. Solving xˆi, i+1 < 0 for
∆pφ ≡ pφi − pφi+1 we get ∆pφ >
(
1−β
n−1
)2
as critical condition for consumer
migration. Obviously the critical threshold on the right hand side decreases
with the number of firms entering, n, and with the breadth of the patent,
β. Inserting the equilibrium prices for any number of firms N > 3 and
solving for β, the critical condition for asymmetric prices translates into a
critical threshold of patent breadth. We find that consumers migrate when-
ever β > βcmeN . ¤
Proof of Lemma 2:
First let us show that firm i’ s demand is smallest for high pφi and low p
φ
i+1.
We have Dφi = xˆi, ρ + xˆi, i+1. From equations (8) and (10) we get xˆi, ρ and
xˆi, i+1. Now inserting the price reaction functions p
φ
ρ from equation (13) and
pφi+1 from equation (15), assuming that due to its negligible impact on i’ s
pricing decision pφi+2 can be treated as a constant, we have ∂D
φ
i /∂p
φ
i < 0.
To analyze the influence of firm i + 1’ s pricing decision we substitute pφρ
and pφi (see equation (14)) in D
φ
i and get ∂D
φ
i /∂p
φ
i+1 > 0. Thus we have
that Dφi reaches its lowest values for high p
φ
i and low p
φ
i+1. Next we need
to show that in the case that pφi+1 reaches its minimum and p
φ
i reaches its
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maximum firm i’ s demand is still positive. This corresponds to the cases
where pφi+1 = 0 and p
φ
i = p
φ
i, 4 as ∂p
φ
i,N/∂N < 0. Inserting n = 3, p
φ
i+1 = 0,
pφi, 4 = (1−β)β/4 and pφρ, 4 = β/8 and solving Dφi > 0 for β we get the critical
condition β > 1/4(−3+√17) ≈ 0.27. Since the patent needs to be restrictive
to have an impact, for n = 3 it must be that β > 1/2 so that the critical
condition for β is always fulfilled. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3:
Differentiating the patentee’s profit function piφρ, 3 = p
φ
ρ, 3D
φ
ρ, 3 we have
∂piφρ, 3
∂β
= pφρ, 3
∂Dφρ, 3
∂β
+
∂pφρ, 3
∂β
Dφρ, 3. (27)
Differentiating the patentee’s demand, Dφρ, 3, see equation (9) with respect to
β using
∂pφρ, 3
∂β
=
1
2
∂pφi, 3
∂β
+
β
4
(28)
and inserting pφi, 3 from equation (20), simplifying yields
∂Dφ
∂β
=
1− 3β + β2
2(3− 2β)
which is negative for any restrictive patent, as then 2/3 < β < 1 holds. Thus
the patentee’s demand decreases with patent breadth.
Now let us turn to the patentee’s price choice. Obviously the derivative of
his optimal price, see equation (28), with respect to β is positive whenever
∂pφi, 3
∂β
> −β
2
.
It is easy to show that for 2/3 < β < 1 the derivative ∂pφi, 3/∂β (from equa-
tion (20)) fulfills this condition whenever β < βo with βo ≡ (−3 +√105)/8.
Thus, as patent breadth rises the patentee will increase his price until the
critical threshold βo is reached. After this point a further increase will lead
to a price reduction as the negative influence of the decreasing prices of the
28
border firms, ∂pφi, 3/∂β, becomes dominant.
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¤
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) Due to model assumptions we have that for β ≤ 2/N¯ the profit func-
tions in the respective cases patent or secrecy coincide, piφ
ρ, N¯
= pis
ρ, N¯
, in
which case the innovator prefers secrecy.
(ii) Further it can be shown for all piφ
ρ,Nφ
with Nφ > 3 that ∂piφ
ρ,Nφ
/∂β > 0.
Since pisρ,Ns is independent of β, it must then be that pi
φ
ρ, N¯
> pis
ρ, N¯
∀ β >
2/N¯ . For Nφ = 3 solving piφρ, 3 − pisρ, 3 > 0 for β yields β > 0.915.
(iii) As obviously pis
ρ, N¯
> pis
ρ, N¯+1
, then piφ
ρ, N¯
> pis
ρ, N¯+1
is always fulfilled and
the innovator prefers to patent. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) In the cases N s < 3 the profits of the innovator are the same with
secrecy and with a patent, see equations (4) and (6). It is easy to show
that piρ, 1 > piρ, 2 holds within the domain of v (see Footnote 10). Thus
if piρ, 2 > pi
φ
ρ,Nφ
for Nφ > 2 holds, it is never profitable to patent for
N s < 3. Obviously piρ, 2 > pi
φ
ρ, 3 for all β. This leaves us to show that
piφρ, 3 > pi
φ
ρ,Nφ
with Nφ > 3. Using pφ and Dφ from equations (6) and
(9) it is easy to show that ∂piφ
ρ,Nφ
/∂pφi < 0 generally holds. Knowing
that ∂pφi /∂N
φ < 0 we can conclude that ∂piφρ/∂N
φ < 0. Consequently
piφρ, 3 > pi
φ
ρ,Nφ
must hold so that a patent is never profitable for N s < 3.
For N s = 3 we need to show that pisρ, 3 > pi
φ
ρ,Nφ
for Nφ > 3. In the limit
β → ∞ all patent profits tend to 1/32. We know that ∂piφ
ρ,Nφ
/∂β > 0
with Nφ > 3 so that 1/32 is the maximum value patent profits can
reach. Since pisρ, 3 > 1/32 the innovator will always prefer secrecy.
(ii) In the limit β → 0 all patent profits tend to zero and for β → ∞
all patent profits tend to 1/32. As ∂piφ
ρ,Nφ
/∂β > 0∀Nφ > 3 and
22Note a dominant price effect only occurs in the case Nφ = 3 as then prices under
a restrictive patent are higher than in all cases Nφ > 3. Consequently, as in the limit
for β → 1 all prices tend to zero, the downward slope of the price function ∂pφ
i,Nφ
/∂β is
highest for Nφ = 3 so that the patentee’s neighbors are affected relatively stronger than
in the cases Nφ > 3.
29
piρ,Ns < 1/32 for N
s > 4 all patent and secrecy profit functions must
have exactly one intersection point whenever Nφ < N s and Nφ, s > 3.
We get βˆNs, Nφ by solving pi
s
ρ,Ns = pi
φ
ρ,Nphi for β. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3:
Solving piφ
ρ, nφ
∣∣
Nφ→∞
> pisρ,Ns with pi
s
ρ = 1/(N
s)3, see equation (4) for β yields
the critical threshold β > 2 3
√
4/N s. Note that the right hand side is greater
than unity whenever N s ≤ 3. Since β ∈ ]0, 1[, the inequality can never be
fulfilled for N s ≤ 3 and thus the innovator chooses secrecy. ¤
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